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We investigate whether government budget deficits and real interest rates have a long-
run relationship with the current account of the balance of payments in 23 OECD 
countries. Such an investigation is of interest since large and persistent budget deficits 
may impose strains on the foreign exchange markets and are considered by some to be 
one of the main causes of crises in international financial markets. We permit regime 
shifts in the cointegration analysis, which extends empirical modelling relative to 
existing studies. We find that the admission of regime shifts substantially influences the 
empirical conclusions: we find a long run relationship between budget deficits, real 
interest rate and current account deficit in 13 out of 23 countries whereas the number of 
countries with apparent long-run relationships is dramatically reduced when regime 
shifts are not permitted. We argue that, when structural breaks are taken into account, it 
seems to be the countries with a more extensive financial infrastructure in which the 
twin deficits are less likely to be conjoined. 
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The aim of this paper is to explore the impact of budget deficits and real interest 
rates on the current accounts of the balance of payments, using cointegration analyses 
with structural breaks. Variability of current account and budget deficits across time-
series and  cross-section dimensions is high in both developed and developing countries 
(Chinn and Prasad (2003)) and large current account deficits have been considered as 
one of the main factors causing major currency crashes; see Edwards (2001) for a 
survey. The notion of current account sustainability has gained policy significance in 
the context of recent episodes of macroeconomic turbulence (Chinn and Prasad (2003), 
p. 48). Hence the question of whether or not government budget deficits influence 
current account deficits in some predictable way has important policy implications. 
 The existing theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the impact of 
budget deficits on trade deficits is inconclusive (Ghatak and Ghatak, 1996; Ricciuti, 
2003). We also note that most of the empirical studies based on time series data do not 
incorporate structural breaks in their modelling. To address this gap in the literature, this 
paper examines the interaction of trade deficits with budget deficits and real interest 
rates using cointegration analysis in 23 developed countries.  
Cointegration implies that the twin deficits and interest rates do not move 
independently of each other and thus favours the Keynesian perspective – see section 2 
below. Tests for cointegration that follow Engle and Granger (1987)  - henceforth EG, 
presume that the cointegrating vector is time-invariant. This is not appropriate if the 
relationship between the variables of interest experiences a structural break at some date 
within the sample period. Identifying the existence of such regime shifts is important 
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since unacknowledged regime changes might lead to mis-specification bias in model 
estimation. We therefore apply the approach of Gregory and Hansen (1996) – 
henceforth GH, which permits a structural break. 
This paper is organised as follows: in section two, the existing literature is 
reviewed and the empirical specification of the model is explained. Section three 
presents the conclusions to be drawn from the empirical results. The methodology is 
outlined in appendix A. Appendix B collates the detailed statistical results. 
 
2. Theory and Empirical Model Specification 
There are several channels through which budget deficits may affect trade deficits 
(Khalid and Guan, 1999, p. 390; Rosenswieg and Tallman, 1993, p. 580). Firstly, in a 
Mundell-Fleming framework and under flexible exchange rates, an increase in 
government deficits would induce an upward pressure on real interest rates, causing 
capital inflows and thereby raising the foreign exchange value of domestic currency, i.e. 
an appreciation in real exchange rates. The stronger currency in turn reduces net 
exports, i.e. there is a rise (or fall) in trade deficits (or surpluses). This mechanism is 
also effective under fixed exchange rate regimes. The Keynesian proposition asserts that 
the fiscal stimulus under a fixed exchange rate generates higher nominal income, 
causing an appreciation of domestic currency that worsens the current account balance – 
see Anoruo and Ramchander (1998). The Keynesian absorption theory predicts that a 
rise in budget deficits increases domestic expenditure and hence an expansion in 
imports causes current account deficits. Thus, a rise in budget deficits and a resulting 
increase in the real interest rate increase (reduce) current account deficits (surpluses).  
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Finally, a correlation between saving and investment (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) 
would also cause budget deficit and current account deficit to move together, supporting 
the twin deficits hypothesis. The link between fiscal accounts and the external balance 
can be expressed by rearranging the national income accounting identity: 
    NTXMTGSI PP   (2.1) 
where IP is private investment, SP is private saving, G is government spending, T is 
government revenue, M is imports, X is exports and NT is net current transfers from 
abroad. This equation states that as long as (IP - SP) remains stable, changes in fiscal 
deficits (G - T) will be closely associated with movements in current account deficits 
(X - M -  NT)
4
. 
Contrary to the Mundel-Fleming model, the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis 
(REH) predicts no causal relationship between trade and budget deficits: shifts between 
taxes and budget deficits do not have any impact upon the real interest rate, the quantity 
of investment or the current account balance. A reduction in current taxes will not affect 
desired national saving, when government spending is held constant and there are no 
borrowing constraints (Ricciuti, 2003, for a survey). This follows from the argument 
that a present tax cut is inevitably followed by a future tax increase. Rational response 
by non-myopic citizens implies that the resulting government deficit does not have any 
impact upon the economy (Barro, 1974)). A model incorporating Ricardian equivalence 
would suggest that a substitution of debt for taxes by the government that increases the 
                                               
4 However, the relationship between fiscal and external deficits may be weakened if increases in 
government expenditures are associated with reductions of private investment (crowding out effect). This 
happens when economic agents can anticipate that a current increase in public debt is associated with a 
future tax increase. 
4 
fiscal deficits would be financed by increased private saving, rather than increased net 
foreign borrowing (trade deficits) (Rosenswieg and Tallman, 1993, p. 582).  
The following specification can be used to test whether the current account 
deficit is independent of the fiscal deficit:  
rBDGDPCAGDP 21    (2.2) 
 
We use annual data covering the period 1960 – 2000. CAGDP and BDGDP are, 
respectively, the current account and budget deficits, as a percentage of GDP, r is the 
real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation). The existence of 
cointegration between these three variables, or between CAGDP and BDGDP alone, is 
evidence that the two deficits do not move independently, as the REH perspective 
would have it. Positive values for 1 and 2 in the cointegrating vector support the 
Keynesian perspective.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
We follow GH in considering the case where the individual series are integrated of 
order one -  1I . Hence, we preceded our application of the GH procedure with 
univariate investigation of the constituent series for each country. Using ADF tests
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with two lags, we found that almost all of our series behave as  1I  within the 
estimation period. The unit root null was rejected in 4 of the 69 series at a 10% 
significance level. We do not exclude any of these countries since we might expect 6 or 
7 false rejections by chance at this significance level, and no country suffered more than 
                                               
5 Reported more fully in Appendix B. 
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one such rejection. In seven series the test statistic suggested acceptance of a unit root in 
the differences, suggesting possible  2I  behaviour. For this exercise we have not 
excluded the countries in question but note Italy as a country which failed twice in these 
preliminary diagnostics.  
 Our main objective has been to discover whether the admission of structural 
breaks might substantially impact on the empirical support for either of the Keynesian 
and REH perspectives. Table 1 summarises the evidence
6
 and is read as follows. Results 
for each country are reported in each of three scenarios: standard cointegration without 
breaks (SC), a level shift in which only the intercept of the cointegrating vector is 
permitted to break (LS), and a regime shift in which the slope coefficients of the 
cointegrating vector may also break (RS). For each of these scenarios the table shows 
the estimated slope coefficients in equation (2.2) with their OLS t-statistics in 
parentheses. In the RS case the table also shows the estimated post-break changes to the 
slopes, with their t-statistics. Shaded cells indicate instances where the test procedure 
suggests cointegration at an asymptotic test size of either 5% (superscripted “cc”), or 
10% (superscripted “c”).  
 
Table 1 : cointegration between CAGDP, BDGDP & r 
 SC LS RS 

















































































                                               
6 Additional detail is provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 1 : cointegration between CAGDP, BDGDP & r 
 SC LS RS 


































































































































































































































































































It is evident that the conclusions with regards to cointegration are substantially altered 
by permitting structural breaks. On balance, there is a noticeable tendency to discover 
cointegration more often than when structural breaks are not permitted. We find a long 
run relationship between budget deficits, real interest rate and current account deficit in 
14 out of 23 countries when a break is permitted but in only 7 countries using 
cointegration analysis without breaks. This suggests that earlier studies which did not 
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allow for structural breaks may have been methodologically biased in favour of 
supporting the REH perspective. 
As to whether the Keynesian perspective is positively supported, we can note 
that, for the (SC) model without breaks, Spain is the only country for which we discover 
a cointegrating vector where the sign of the coefficient on BDGDP is contrary to 
(Keynesian) expectation. This is also true for the pre-break sub-sample of the regime 
shift (RS) scenario but the post-break sub-sample is much less supportive of the 
Keynesian perspective. 
Although this research is preliminary, it is tempting to offer some explanation as 
to why the competing perspectives – Keynesian vs. REH, might each find some 
evidence to favour them. Using the least restrictive (RS) scenario as a basis for 
discussion, we can note that countries which have an established reputation as 
international financial centres are more likely to provide evidence, i.e. non-
cointegration, in favour of the REH perspective. We might therefore posit the 
hypothesis that a more developed financial infrastructure makes it more likely that what 
is logically rational behaviour in the theory of Ricardian Equivalence is also feasible 
action in the real world. It is also noteworthy that, where cointegration is detected in the 
RS scenario, the signs of the estimated coefficients are less supportive of the Keynesian 
perspective in the post-break sub-sample, which may be grounds for speculating that a 
strengthening of financial infrastructure throughout these OECD countries has rendered 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) (GH) modify the Engle-Granger (1987) (EG) approach to 
testing for the existence of a single cointegrating relationship by allowing that the 
coefficients of this equation may undergo a structural break. The date of the break is not 
specified beforehand; it is estimated within the GH procedure by considering all dates 
within the sample (except those too close to the sample end-points) as candidates for a 
structural break and selecting from these the one that produces the most convincing 
evidence of cointegration. To decide whether this evidence is statistically significant, 
the GH procedure replaces the critical values appropriate to the EG approach with 
critical values arrived at by Monte Carlo simulation of the modified procedure.  
 In our investigation, equation 2.2 provides the vehicle for EG tests for 










The GH procedure requires that we modify this equation by introducing a dummy 























(Here [x] indicates the integer part of x.) This dummy variable can be used to model a 
variety of forms of structural break. We consider two of these: a level shift (LS) and a 










The regime shift model allows for the possibility that the slope coefficients of the 

















The GH procedure consists of applying one of these models sequentially for all break 
dates within the permitted range of    ntn 85.015.0   and, for each such break date, 
computing a statistic to test the null of no cointegration. If the most extreme value thus 
obtained for the test statistic exceeds the GH critical value then we reject the null in 
favour of “cointegration with a structural break”.  
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Appendix B: Statistical Results 
Table B1: Unit Root Tests 
         
Country Sample Period Variables 
   levels First Difference 
         
 Begin End bdgdp cagdp r bdgdp cagdp r 
Austria 1960 1994 -1.202 -2.295 -1.903 -4.346 ** -4.495 ** -2.689 
Australia 1960 1997 -3.079 * -2.020 -1.463 -3.891 ** -4.725 ** -3.743 ** 
Belgium 1960 1998 -1.493 -1.942 -2.167 -3.395* -4.951 ** -3.460 * 
Canada 1960 2000 -1.564 -1.384 -2.349 -3.669 ** -3.371 * -6.495 ** 
Denmark 1960 1999 -3.507 ** -0.957 -2.147 -4.094 ** -3.307 * -4.535 ** 
Finland 1960 1998 -2.641 -1.816 -2.304 -3.481 * -4.017 ** -4.827 ** 
France 1960 1997 -1.787 -2.022 -1.606 -4.137 ** -3.832 ** -5.728 ** 
Germany 1960 1998 -2.354 -2.168 -2.265 -4.437 ** -3.115 * -4.353 ** 
Greece 1961 1999 -1.456 -2.955 -1.418 -5.336 ** -6.307 ** -4.152 ** 
Iceland 1960 2000 -2.129 -2.696 -1.744 -3.192 * -4.138 ** -3.950 ** 
Ireland 1960 1999 -0.655 -1.929 -2.037 -3.409 * -4.787 ** -4.733 ** 
Italy 1960 1998 -1.022 -2.306 -1.508 -2.300 -4.143 ** -2.949 
Japan 1970 1993 -1.155 -1.704 -1.366 -1.269 -3.040 * -3.110 * 
Luxembourg 1973 1997 -2.634 -1.592 -1.855 -3.557** -3.278 * -4.084 ** 
Netherlands 1960 1998 -1.964 -2.457 -1.880 -4.083 ** -3.702 ** -3.756 ** 
New Zealand 1960 2000 -1.316 -2.471 -1.519 -2.610 -4.671 ** -3.996 ** 
Norway 1960 1998 -3.191 * -2.682 -1.067 -4.741 ** -4.193 ** -4.304 ** 
Portugal 1970 1998 -1.342 -2.865 -1.330 -2.520 -4.187 ** -3.045 * 
Spain 1962 1998 -2.480 -4.881 ** -1.678 -2.110 -4.818 ** -3.718 ** 
Sweden 1960 2000 -2.944 -1.748 -1.649 -3.107 * -3.317 * -4.887 ** 
Switzerland 1960 2000 -2.502 -0.634 -2.465 -4.859 ** -3.891 ** -4.256 ** 
UK 1960 1999 -2.713 -2.493 -1.814 -3.342 * -4.090 ** -4.462 ** 
USA 1960 2000 -1.053 -1.079 -2.361 -3.691 ** -3.098 * -4.675 ** 
* and ** imply the level of significance at 10% and 5%, respectively. The 5% and 10% critical values are approximately  
- 3.5% and –3.0, respectively. The number of lags chosen is two for both levels and first difference. 
 





Table B2 – results of GH procedure 
 
Country, sample periods  
And model types 





Austria:1960-1994, one regressor 




    -3.30 0.000 0.99 






   1981 -5.10* 0.224 1.58 








 1981 -5.16* 0.31 1.59 
Austria:1960-1994: Two regressors 






   -3.91* 0.09 1.21 








  1981 -5.10* 0.23 1.60 












1981 -5.35* 0.31 1.62 
Australia:1960-1997: One regressor 




    -3.57 0.001 0.96 






   1978 -4.92** 0.28 1.31 








 1978 -5.05** 0.29 1.33 
Australia:1960-1997: Two regressors 






   -4.94** 0.30 1.45 








  1974 -5.51** 0.39 1.40 












1974 -5.70* 0.44 1.46 
Belgium: 1960 – 1998: One regressor 




    -0.98 0.02 0.17 






   1987 -3.94 0.52 0.57 








 1986 -3.98 0.60 0.46 
Belgium: 1960 – 1998: Two regressors 






   -0.99 0.02 0.17 








  1987 -3.77 0.58 0.75 












1977 -3.94 0.43 0.44 
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Table B2 continued 
 
Country, sample periods  
And model types 





Canada:1960-2000: One regressor 




    -1.25 0.02 0.28 






   1980 -4.66* 0.60 0.80 








 1980 -4.82 0.60 0.84 
Canada:1960-2000: Two regressors 






   -2.84 0.17 0.49 








  1980 -4.61* 0.60 0.81 












1980 -4.70 0.60 0.85 
Denmark:1960-1999: One regressor 




    -2.17 0.003 0.54 






   1988 -5.25** 0.58 1.32 








 1985 -5.71** 0.57 1.66 
Denmark:1960-1999: Two regressors 






   -2.97 0.15 0.86 








  1988 -5.26** 0.57 1.33 












1985 -5.94** 0.57 1.68 
Finland:1960-1998: One regressor 




    -2.50 0.01 0.44 






   1992 -4.00 0.47 0.79 








 1991 -4.27 0.40 0.94 
Finland:1960-1998: Two regressors 






   -3.45 0.09 0.43 








  1992 -3.87 0.50 0.78 












1990 -4.33 0.34 0.95 
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Table B2 continued 
 
Country, sample periods  
And model types 





France:1960-1997: One regressor 




    -3.28 0.10 1.12 






   1991 -4.66* 0.23 1.47 








 1984 -4.79 0.24 1.61 
France:1960-1997: Two regressors 






   -3.20 0.17 1.08 








  1991 -5.17* 0.26 1.40 












1991 -5.25 0.29 1.52 
Germany:1960-1998: One regressor 




    -2.92 0.02 0.50 






   1968 -3.06 0.06 0.54 








 1977 -3.37 0.31 1.00 
Germany:1960-1998: Two regressors 






   -2.42 0.04 0.57 








  1992 -3.19 0.20 0.77 












1984 -3.90 0.33 1.18 
Greece:1960-1999: One regressor 




    -3.61 0.03 0.95 






   1987 -4.92* 0.23 1.26 








 1987 -6.49** 0.52 1.54 
Greece:1960-1999: Two regressors 






   -4.91** 0.41 1.53 








  1982 -5.60** 0.45 1.74 












1987 -5.97** 0.60 1.76 
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Table B2 continued 
 
Country, sample periods  
And model types 





Iceland:1960-1997: One regressor 




    -1.2 0.11 1.55 






   1983 -6.11** 0.16 1.61 








 1985 -6.36** 0.29 1.68 
Iceland:1960-1997: Two regressors 






   -5.99** 0.14 1.71 








  1983 -6.15** 0.17 1.66 








  1986 -6.58** 0.32 1.77 
Ireland:1960-1999: One regressor 




    -3.40 0.37 0.92 






   1984 -5.36** 0.57 1.44 








 1982 -5.48** 0.63 1.53 
Ireland:1960-1999: Two regressors 






   -4.02 0.44 1.19 








  1970 -5.36** 0.50 1.33 












1979 -5.67** 0.53 1.42 
Italy:1960-1998: One regressor 




    -3.84 0.23 1.12 






   1973 -4.44 0.26 1.02 








 1966 -4.50 0.32 1.37 
Italy:1960-1998: Two regressors 






   -3.99 0.27 1.17 








  1965 -4.37 0.31 1.36 












1974 -4.78 0.38 1.16 
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 Table B2 continued 
 
Country, sample periods  
and model types 





Japan: 1970 – 1993, one regressor 




    -2.71 0.07 0.59 






   1982 -5.79* 0.47 1.09 








 1982 -6.22* 0.48 1.16 
Japan: 1970 – 1993, two regressors 






   -3.66 0.38 1.04 








  1982 -4.90* 0.51 1.11 












1980 -4.70 0.49 1.21 
Luxembourg: 1973 – 1997: One regressor 




    -2.51 0.11 0.77 






   1990 -3.31 0.22 1.00 








 1982 -3.51 0.34 1.35 
Luxembourg: 1973 – 1997: Two regressors 






   -2.53 0.17 0.84 








  1990 -4.35 0.39 1.53 












1983 -5.19 0.48 1.55 
Netherlands:1960-1998: One regressor 




    -2.21 0.01 0.46 






   1975 -4.75* 0.30 0.87 








 1975 -4.55 0.40 0.88 
Netherlands:1960-1998: Two regressors 






   -2.26 0.01 0.49 








  1981 -4.65* 0.59 1.22 












1981 -4.72 0.60 1.18 
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 Table B2 continued 
 
Country, sample periods  
and model types 





New Zealand:1960-2000: One regressor 




    -3.33 0.02 0.88 






   1972 -5.59** 0.39 1.55 








 1977 -6.30** 0.43 1.99 
New Zealand:1960-2000: Two regressors 






   -3.31 0.02 0.87 








  1984 -5.78** 0.49 1.73 












1976 -6.05** 0.49 1.90 
Norway:1960-1998: One regressor 




    -2.62 0.16 0.62 






   1988 -4.54 0.39 0.88 








 1985 -5.31* 0.46 0.97 
Norway:1960-1998: Two regressors 






   -3.10 0.30 0.82 








  1991 -4.84 0.48 1.00 












1985 -5.89* 0.57 1.06 
Portugal:1970-1998: One regressor 




    -2.46 0.06 0.80 






   1994 -3.03 0.15 0.90 








 1985 -4.86* 0.52 1.60 
Portugal:1970-1998: Two regressors 






   -2.31 0.16 0.73 








  1990 -5.36* 0.30 1.00 












1990 -5.07 0.44 1.08 
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Table B2 continued 
 
Country, sample periods  
and model types 





Spain:1962-1998: One regressor 




    -5.45** 0.01 0.77 






   1975 -5.79** 0.08 0.85 








 1980 -6.00** 0.07 0.82 
Spain:1962-1998: Two regressors 






   -5.44** 0.01 0.77 








  1975 -5.78** 0.08 0.85 












1989 -6.45** 0.28 1.16 
Sweden:1960-2000: One regressor 




    -2.30 0.10 0.53 






   1993 -4.14 0.60 1.04 








 1993 -4.22 0.60 1.04 
Sweden:1960-2000: Two regressors 






   -2.63 0.13 0.65 








  1990 -4.22 0.28 0.74 












1991 -4.08 0.38 0.81 
Switzerland:1960-2000: One regressor 




    0.49 0.08 0.26 






   1987 -3.04 0.49 0.50 








 1987 -3.01 0.49 0.58 
Switzerland:1960-2000: Two regressors 






   -1.55 0.39 0.56 








  1994 -3.02 0.63 0.88 












1990 -4.44 0.65 0.89 
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Table B2 continued 
Country, sample periods  
and model types 





United Kingdom: 1960-1999: One regressor 




    -3.01 0.01 0.52 






   1985 -4.11 0.31 0.80 








 1989 -3.69 0.25 0.72 
United Kingdom: 1960-1999: Two regressors 






   -3.05 0.02 0.53 








  1985 -4.39 0.35 0.94 












1985 -4.51 0.41 1.00 
USA:1960-2000: One regressor 




    -0.27 0.001 0.21 






   1980 -3.92 0.58 0.58 








 1979 -4.40 0.54 0.64 
USA:1960-2000: Two regressors 






   -1.26 0.26 0.40 








  1977 -3.98 0.60 0.50 












1980 -4.78 0.72 0.76 
 
Critical values (CVs) with one regressor and without structural breaks (nobs = 40): -3.64 (at 5% 
level of significance); -3.29 (at 10% level of significance) 
 
CVs with two regressors and without structural breaks ((nobs=40?)): - 4.07 (at 5% level of 
significance); -3.71 (at 10% level of significance) 
 
Critical values with one regressor and structural breaks : at 5% level of significance: LS =4.61, 
LST = -4.99, RS = -4.95  : at 10% level of significance: LS = -4.34, LST = -4.72, RS = -4.68 
 
Critical values with two regressor and structural breaks : at 5% level of significance: LS = -4.92, 
LST = -5.29, RS = -5.50: at 10% level of significance: LS = -4.69, LST = -5.03, RS = -5.23 
 
** - significant at the 1% level, * - significant at the 5% level  
 
Shift types are LS: Level Shift (GHp103 cagdpll this cagdpse "C");  LST: Level Shift with Trend 
(GHp103 cagdpll this cagdpse "C/T"),  RS: Regime Shift (GHp103 cagdpll this cagdpse "C/S") 
 
 
 
